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COMPUTER ABUSE AND COMPUTER
CRIME AS ORGANIZATIONAL
ACTIVITIES
By Rob Kling*
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Introduction • i-fyy;, r.,;
"Computer abuse," "computer crime," and "computer fraud" ,^e .
sensitizing concepts, they suggest that unsavof^ ifraaices\.ditfrr;ifr•;
significant ways from "usual" events when a computer is employed
as a critical instrument. For example, individiial thefts may more /
easily be in hundreds of thousands or even milUons of dollars be
cause of the volume of funds accessible in computerized accounts.
Frauds may be more difficult to uncover, since computerized mes
are often substantially more complex and difficult to audit than then-
manual precursors.2 The overcharging of supermarket customers
may become more common with product scanners and the disappearance of individually marked prices on each item, since custom-
* Professor, Department of Information and Computer Science, University ofCa1if"-nifl, Irvine, California. The author wishes to acknowledge toe hrfpfto com
ments of Jay Becker, Robert Bigelow, Sharon Davis, Elihu Gerson, Donn Parker and
Susan Strom on earlier drafts of this article. , . . . ^ j
1 Most analysts of computer crime emphasize the extent to which automated
data systems are vulnerable to large scale thefts See e.g men,
Guide to Computer Systems, 53 Hakv. Bus. Rev., July-Aug 1975 at 75, Klmg, EFTS.
Social and Technical Issues, 7Computers &Soc'y, FaU 1976, at 3, Khng, Valw Con
flicts and Social Choice inElectronic Funds Transfer System Developments, 21 Com.
ACM 642 (1978)- D. Parker, Crime by Computer (1976), Parker, Vulnerabihttes of
efts to Intentionally Caused Losses, 22 Com. ACM 654 (1979), T. Wh^eside Com
puter Capers- Tales of Electronic Thievery, Embezzlement and Fraud (1978).
However, there is some good evidence that the"typical" reported computer cnme en-
teUs losses of several thousands of dollars, rather than several hun^ds of th°"sands
of dollars. See Taber, ASurvey of Computer Crime Studies, 2Comp^r/L.J. 275(1980), C. Sartorius &S: Lam, Computer Crime and Abuse: Sources of Data and the
Magnitude ofReported Events (Mar. 1980) (unpublished manuscript).
2. See L. Krauss &A. MacGahan, Computer Fraud and Countermeasures
(1979).
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ers will be less easily able to double-check their bills.^ Outside
auditors may be unduly impressed by an organization which is ex
tensively automated with particularly sophisticated, complex sys
tems.^
Analysts of computer abuse are quickto point out that activities
such as these fall under conventional criminal labels, e.g., theft,
fraud.5 They also argue that employing a computer as a critical in
strument alters the character of these crimes, since such abuses are
particularly subtle and difficult to detect.^ While most analysts of
computer abuse devote some attention to the nature of computers
that make these episodes special, little explicit attention is given to
the conceptions of "abuse" and "crime," the manner in which these
conceptions may vary across social contexts, and the social contexts
in which they are most likely to occur.
Implicit images are, of course, employed in the selection and in
terpretation of illustrative cases^usually frauds and thefts such as
embezzlement. Concepts of computer crime or abuse are normally
elaborated through case examples, rather than conceptually. Partly
3. See Puzo, The Pitfalls of PricelessProducts, or How the Crackers Went Awry,
L.A. Times, Jan. 20, 1980,pt. V, at 3.
4. Seethe Equity Funding case reported in D. Parker, Crime by Computer, eh.
13 (1976) andT. Whiteside, supra note 1, ch. 2. See also Kling, Automated'Welfare
Client-tracking and Service Integration: The Political Economy of Computing, 21
Com. ACM 484 (1978).
5. See C. Wagner, The CPA and Computer Fraud (1979). Wagner lists twenty-
one synonyms for "computer abuse," "computer crime," and"computer fraud." Id.at
31-34. . . X.
6. Some analysts alsoargue that crimes associated withcomputer wiU shiftfrom
losses characterized by "high incidence, low loss per event" to "low incidence, high
loss per event." See, e.g., Parker, Computer-Related White Collar Crime, in White
Collar r.RTME 199 (G. Geis &E. Stotland eds. 1980). This interpretation hinges both
on a particular conception of "computer crime" and representative data on its inci
dence and the magnitude of associated losses.This article seeks to expand the pre-
vaiUng conceptions of computer abuse and computer crime, and, as a byproduct, to
change the characterof incidents and losses associated with computer abuse.
Having a computer system "associated with" a lossmay make no material differ
ence in the nature of the event. If one party hits another with a desk-top computer,
"computer battery" differs in no material way from simple battery with any other
heavy object, e.g., hammer, typewriter. Arobbery conducted at a liquor store which
uses an automated point-of-sale terminal is unlikely to differ from a robbery at a
store with a manual cash register, except possibly for the amount of cash or negotia
ble paper on hand.
While these observations seem obvious, it would help to have a sharper concep
tion ofthe particular roleplayed by computers in "computer abuses" that meritsdis
tinction. Otherwise, "computer abuse" will become increasingly banalized as
computer systems spread. Crimes and abusive practices will more frequently involve
computer, not becausesomespecial feature ofthe computeris exploited (e.p., remote
access to financial records), but simply because computers are commonplace devices.
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to persuade readers that computer abuses are signiflcant, andpartly
to maintain interest, the cases selected for explication are mainly
those where reported losses are in hundreds of thousands or mil
lions of dollars, rather than in the hundreds of dollars. Often, exam
ples are casually expanded. Stanley Mark Rifkin's famous $10.2
million theft from Security Pacific Bank in 1978 is usually treated as
a computer crime and used to illustrate the magnitude of funds that
can be stolen from electronic funds transfer systems, despite the
fact that Rifkin's theft was accomplished through wire transfers and
no computer system was directly employed.' Yet, such fine-grained
concepts, such as the particularways that computers are instrumen
tal in "computer crimes," are important.
There is a growing body of literature about computerabuse and
computer crime, which range from popular accounts, to handbooks
for auditors® and criminal prosecutors,® computer specialists,^®
consumer advocates,^^ and federal policymakers.^® Each audience
has special needs and interests, but it is difficult to find accounts of
computer abuse or computer crime which enumerate the important
assumptions being made by the author or researcher. Much hinges
on matters such as (1) whether one emphasizes "abuses, crimes,
or "frauds" that are married to computing; (2) the conceptions of
"abuses,""crimes," or "frauds"that are adopted; and, (3) the partic
ular role that computing plays in these events.
Despite the myriad choices about these matters which can be
made in principle, there is substantial concensus over the social lo
cation of perpetrators and victims and the "conventional" natime of
these events. First, most of the cases examined are those in which
businesses are victims; the perpetrators are (ndividuals or small
7. Donn Parker, for example, identifies the case as a "computer abuse, not for
the "transfer" act,but because Rifkin was not authorized access to the terminalarea
where hegained critical information about the transfer codes. Personal communica
tions with Donn Parker (April 24, 1980). See the text accompanying notes 14-30 infra
concerning therole thatcomputer systems should play inanevent for the term "com
puter abuse" or "computer crime" to be helpful. See also note 6 supra.
8. See, e.g., L. Krauss &A. MacGahan, note 2 supra.
9. See, e.g., SRI Int'l, CoMPtrrER Crime: Criminal Justice Resource Manual
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Resource Manual].
10. See, e.g., SterUng, Consumer Difficulties with Computerized Transactions: An
Empirical Investigation, 22 Com. ACM 283 (1979).
11. See Budnitz, The Problems of Proof When There's a Computer Goof: Consum
ers Versus ATMs, 2 Computer/L.J. 49 (1980); Budnitz, The Impact of EFT Upon
Consumers: Practical Problems Faced by Consumers, 13 U.S.F.L. Rev. 361(1979)[hereinafter Budnitz); Broadman, Electronic Fund Transfer Act: Is the Con
sumerProtected?, id. at 245; Sterling, Computer Ombudsman, 17 Soc'y, Jan.-Feb. 1980,
at 31.
12.' See, e.g., Laudon, Privacy and Federal Data Banks, id. at 50.
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groups acting in relative isolation and pursuing idiosyncratic crimi
nal ventures. Cases in which computer systems are instruments of
businesses acting against their clients, e.g., consumer fraud, are
largely ignored. Second, these events are typically removed from the
social worlds in which they occur and simply labelled as "abuses" or
"crimes," e.g., invasions of priva%, fraud.
These two factors are not merely academic concerns, since
"computer crime" is increasingly becoming subject to special legis
lation. Laws directed specifically at improper activities related to
computers have been enacted in numerous states, and similar le^s-
lation is now pending in several states and in the United State Con-
gress.^^
Some of these practices are legally "crimes," since they violate
existing statutes. However, the "criminal" label cannot be taken for
granted when existing laws must be stretched for the acts in ques
tion to be defined as "crimes." For example, the use of "spare" com
puter time for private, recreational piuposes by a computer
programmer may be viewed as a theft of private property, or merely
as a job perquisite akin to using a company telephone for limited
personal calls. People differ over whether a particular act should be
labelled as an "abuse," and furthermore, even if labelled an abuse,
whether it should be prohibited by law.
K "unauthorized use of computer resources" is legislated as a
criminal offense, an informal, but often accepted work practice
would suddenly be rendered illegal. Similarly, there is considerable
debate about which procedures for handling personally sensitive
data should be considered fair business practices, and which are so
unfair and intrusive that they abuse individual rights of privacy and
should be made illegal.
The Uterature about computer abuse and computer crime is
skewed by emphasizing white collar crimes in which businesses are
the primary victims of thefts and abuses of trust, such as embezzle
ment, while neglecting business crimes and abuses, such as con
sumer fraud, invasions of personal privacy, and contractual
violations in the computer industry. Moreover, the labels "abuse"
and "crime" are usually taken for granted as objective properties of
the acts in question, rather than as the signposts of conflict over
rights and obhgations.
A major goal of this article is to expand the prevailing concep
tions of conlputer abuse to include this wider class of activities. This
article will also examine the etiology of these events. Should they
13. There are currently eleven computer crime statutes. For the text of these stat
utes, see the Appendix in the next issue of the Journal.
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be viewed as the idiosyncratic acts of individuals or as routinized
occurrences in "crimiriogenic" environments? Finally, the article
will examine the social contexts in which computer abuses are
likely to occur, and will emphasize those computer abuses and com
puter crimes that may be viewed as organizational actions, insofar
as the organizations which erSploy the perpetrators also gain from
their actions. ,
I. Computer Abuse and Computer Crime
"Computer abuse" connotes a wide range of unsavory practices
which can be married to computing, e.g., fraud, theft, invasions of
privacy. Selecting "computer abuse" as a sensitizing concept in con
trast with "computer crime" or "computer fraud" offers two advan
tages. First, it allows a larger variety of problematic practices to be
addressed, since the "criminal" status of many acts involving com
puters is unclear. Some of these activities, such as invasion of per
sonal privacy, or swamping consumers with individually addressed
junk mail, may not violate existing statutes. However, much is
gained in the discussion by providing a covering term under which
these acts may be examined.
Second, since the term "computer abuse" is more transparently
a label whose appropriateness is not "given" but negotiated, it is
easier to examine a wider array of actors who participate in and "de
fine" computer abuses and computer crimes than just the perpetra
tor and the victim. These additional actors include "moral
entrepreneurs," who define particular acts as abusive or criminal,
such as security specialists, auditors and law enforcers.^^
The larger social world in which computer abuse is defined is
easily obscured by identifying "computer crime" with the transgres
sion of existing statutes. This larger world is most apjparent when
definitions have not been agreed upon. Currently, "privacy prac
tices" and the use of organizational computer resources for game
playing and other minor personal perquisites by computer special
ists are the subjects of serious controversy. A fortiori, the definition
and legislation of computer crime bills is an important arena in
which actors other than identified perpetrators and victims can
identify themselves and articulate their interests.
For these reasons, the term "computer abuse" will be empha
sized. Since some of the activities carried out with computer assist
ance violate existing legal statutes or are technically frauds, the
narrow terms "computer crime" and "computer fraud" will still be
14. See H. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (1963)-.
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used where appropriate. Even when the activity is a 'near crime,
similar to statutory abuses but technically different in some minor
respect, the appellation "computer crime" may still be used.
Most analysts rely upon implicit conceptions of computer crime
orcomputer abuse. Donn Parker has been most explicit inthis area
by defining "computer abuse" as "any incident associated with com
puter technology in which a victim suffered or could have suffered
loss and a perpetrator by intention made or could have made
gain."^® Unfortunately, this definition allows too broad a connection
between computing and some abusive act, and emphasizes loss too
strictly. It is important to amplify the meanings of the terms "asso
ciated with computers," "loss," and "intentional" if "computer
abuse" is to be differentiated from other events.
A. Incidents Associated tvith Computer Technology
Computer systems must be a critical handmaiden to the loss or
abuse. If computers are merely "used" incidentally, little is gained
by drawing special attention to "computer" abuse. If an extortion
attempt is made by long distance telephone, a computer is "associ
ated with" the act, since direct, long-distance dialing is automated,
but nothing is gained by treating long-distance extortion aided by
the telephone asja "computer crime."
Kan embezzlerfalsifies paper records,which are then fed into a
properly operating, computerized information system, the special
features of computing come into play less thanwhen the software is
altered orthe cpmplexity of computer-related procedures materially
mask the deception.
The extent to which computer-based technologies are in some
way essential to carrying out abuses in which they are employed as
instruments must be resolved on a case-by-case basis, rather than
by some sweeping and astute definition. For the purposes of this ar
ticle, computer technologies are "associated" with abuses or crimes
by being instrumental and essential in fostering the loss, or by being
the object of the loss.
A second kind of "association" between computer technology
and an abuse can occur when computerized products or services are
deceptively represented or contracted for. Because of the complex
ity of computer-based products {e.g., mainframes, system software),
data analyses {e.g., simulation models), and services {e.g., payment
systems), a loss may occur simply by misrepresentation of a prod
uct to a "reasonable" but inexperienced agent, such as a customer
15. D. Parker, supra note 4, at 12.
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or auditor.^®
B. Intentionally Caused Losses
Not all "intentionally caused losses" can be viewed as abuses.
For example, if two parties set up a cash competitiop in which they
use a computer system, such as a programming contest or a game
played bytwo computerized chess programs which theywrote, each
may intent the other to lose, but neither party will feel abused. It is
not sufficient that a party suffer a loss, but that the party suffering
the loss actually feel unfairly treated or the object of illegitimate ac
tions—^genuinely a victim.^''
"Computer abuse" is a sensitizing concept which is difficult to
define sharply. It helps to focus attention on the ways in which
computerized technologies may cause problems for computer-using
organizations or the public. If, for example, one wonders whether
electronic funds transfer systems will be more subject to theft, large
or small, than their manual precursors, computer abuse may be a
useful point of departure.
,11. The Construction OF "Computer Abuses" \
Analysts of computer abuse oftenillustrate important principles
through exemplary cases. For example; to steal from a computer
ized record system, one might only need to manipulate normal
transaction cards, and need not understand the software-, a com
puter theftmay be accomplished byemploying a data entryclerk as
an accomplice; computerfrauds can survive standard audits and are
often found only through accidental occurrences.^®
Knowledge of patterns like these is important to those seeking
to diminish the volume and frequency of loss by designing different
16. Because of their complexity, computer-based products are often not well un
derstood in detail by their developers, vendors, users or other participants. Conse
quently, descriptions ofcomputing products or computer-based services may include
unintentional misrepresentations. Such misrepresentations should, on the average,
serve no particular interest,sinceerrors mayequally seiye the vendor or the vendee.
In this acticle, negligent or intentionalmisrepresentations are emphasized.
17. The conception of "victims" as used in this article is entirely subjective.
Nonetheless, difficulties remain, since not every party who suffers a clear loss in the
eyes ofothers will feel victimized. Some battered wives feel thatthey "deserve" their
ill treatment; some patients who have been crippled by the malpractice of doctore
feel gratitude ratherthananger, since theybelieve that theirlives were saved, even if
they were needlessly paralyzed in the opinion ofotherphysicians.
18. The more serious compendia each include over a dozen cases. See Allen, note
1 supra-, D. Pahker, note 4 supra-, T. WHiTEsroE, note 1 supra-, L. Krauss &A. Mac-
Gahan, note 2 supra.
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computer systems, altering organizational procedures, or enacting
and enforcing laws. The literature on computer abuse has been
largely developed to draw attention to the peculiar properties of
computer systems that make them more complex. Many analysts of
computer crime view themselves as demythologizing or debunking
"conventional" images, which attribute extensive security to auto
mated systems, or which treat crimes with computers as no different
in kind, strategy, or consequence from crimes without a computer.
Theoretically, the illustrative, reported cases would span the
range of actual and potential abuses. In actuality, they form a pecu
liarly biased collection.^® The lion's share of the attention is turned
to episodes of theft or fraud where the victim is a computer-using
organization and the identified perpetrator is an individual or small
group engaged in clearly illegal acts.^® These cases (or "capers''^^ )
are briefiy presented in most reports, and are similar to formula
detective stories sans the detective.^^ Much of the attention focuses
on the scheme used by the perpetrators, and possibly on the organi
zational practices which allowed them to continue undetected. Typi
cally, these incidents are large frauds or embezzlements in which
the loss to the victimized business is in the hundreds of thousands
or millions of dollars. The sheer scale of these frauds and/or thefts
helps the analyst dramatize their importance.
19. There is no way to obtain an "unbiased" sample, and the critical questions of
"bias" revolve around the particular biases in any sample. All samples are marred by
underreporting and the happenstance manner in which investigators leams about
cases through professional contacts and friends. In addition, case collections like
Parker's, which depend upon newspaper articles as a critical resource, are also sub
ject to the biases of the news reporting, which emphasizes sensational events and
world views consistent with the preferences of elite institutions. Newspaper stories
serve as a rich and efficient resource for obtaining leads for some kinds of cases, but
they must be supplemented by other sources.For an accounting of the structural bi
ases in newsmaking, see G. Tuchman, Making News: A Stody in the Construction
OF Reality (1978).
20. See note 2 supra. The primary exception is in D. Parker, supra note 4, ch. 4.
21. See T. Whiteside, note 1 supra:
22. One might suspect that computer abuses would conform more aptly to the
formulas of crime novels than detectiye stories, since attention is directed at the de
ceptions of the perpetrator and the logical sequence of events, rather than the foren
sic powers of the investigators. In fact, since many computer aubses are discoverd by
accident or when a perpetrator confesses on his own initiative, the absence of "detec
tion" is even more characteristic of computer abuse. Symon contrasts "crime novels"
with "detective novels" and argnes that detective novels emphasize a plot based upon
deception, while crime novels depict relatively straightforward crimes and focus on
the circumstances and interactions of the characters. J. Symon, Mortal Conse
quences: A History from the Detective Story to the Crime Novel (1972). See
also J. Cawelti, Adventure, Mystery and Romance: Formula Stories as Art and
Popular Culture (1976).
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In order to understand the social and technical conditions under
which different acts are likely to be defined as computer abuses and
are likely to occur, it is useful to have a set of categories to situate
the major actors and their relationship to one another. In the spe
cial case of while collar crime, Edelhertz suggests a useful classifica
tion for situating "perpetrators" and "victims":
1. Crimes by persons operating on an individual, ad hoc basis, for
personal gain in a nonbusiness context (hereinafter referred to as
"personal crimes");
2. Crimes in the course of their occupation by thpse operating in
side businesses. Government, or other establishments, or in a pro
fessional capacity, in violation of their duty of loyalty and fidelity to
employer or client (hereinafter referred to as "abuses of trust");
3. Crimes incidental to and in furtherance of business operations,
but not the central purpose of such business operations (hereinaf
ter referred to as "business crimes");
4. White collar crimes as a business, or as the central activity of the
business (hereinafter referred to as "con games").
While organizations may be victims of white collar crimes in
any of these categories, individual clients are most likely to be vic
timized by business crimes and con games.^^ While technically, all
of these crimes are perpetrated by "individuals," as one moyes from
personal crimes to con games, the social scale of the collusion help
ful for success increases. In Edelhertz's terms, most of the cases of
computer crime which appear in the literature illustrate personal
23. H. Edelhertz, The Nature, Impact and Prosecution of White-Collar
Crime (1970), quoted in S. Reid, Crime and Criminology 223 (1976).
24. Individuals can be victimized by abuses of trust and businesses can be vic
timized by others engaged in business crimes, such as consumer fraud. These are
relatively gross generalizations. Books written for auditors either assume that the
computer-using organization is acting ethically or argue that it should be. See L.
Krauss & A. MacGahan, supra note 2, at ch. 3; C. Wagner, note 5 supra. Parker de
votes an entire chapter to consumer fraud (D. Parker, supra note 4, ch. 22, but ne
glects consumer fraud as a possibility in his analysis of consumer losses from
electronic funds transfer systems. Parker, Vulnerabilities of. EFTs to Intentionally
Causes Losses, 22 Com. ACM 654 (1979). Oddly, he also neglects Sterling's study of
consumer difficulties with computerized billing systems, which was reported in a
prior issue of the same journal. Sterling, note 10 supra. Parker also analyses "busi
ness crimes" in that same article, but these are clearly personal crimes and abuses of
trust. Business crimes, in the sense that that term is used in this article, are ignored.
Moreover, Parker's analysis of "computer abuse perpetrators" only treats people who
have engaged in personal crimes or abuses of trust, not in business crimes or con
games.
August Bequai devotes a chapter to "consumer-related frauds" and a chapter to
"crime by computer" in A. Bequai, White Collar Crime: A 20rH-CENTURY Crisis,
chs. 7,12 (1978). However, the analysis of consumer fraud does not mention computer
use, and the chapter on computer crime examines only personal crimes and abuses
of trust.
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crimes and abuses oftrust; "business crimes" ^e typically excluded
from attention, though that is perhaps the most" important category
for a variety of consumer frauds.^^ One con game, the Equity Fund
ing case, is often cited in. the accounts of computer crime.^®
Much of this article is directed to business crimes. The concept
of"business crime" has beenbest defined by Shpver, who employed
the label "organizational crime" to denote:
criminal acts committed by individuals or groups of individuals,
thus including conspiracies, during the normal course oftheir work
as employees of organizations, which they intend to contribute to
the achievement of goals or other objectives thought to be impor
tant for the organization as a whole, some subunitwithin the organ
ization, or their own particular job duties. '^'
When criminal activities are common to an occupation, and notjust to an organization, e.g., kickbacks from laboratories to doctors,
the term "occupations crime" is a useful designation.^® Business
crimes (or organizational crimes) include price-fixing, false advertis
ing, and consumer fraud. When restricted to the cases where com
puting technology is instrumental, "business computer crimes" are
most likely to be consumer fraud and contractual fraud. When
these conceptions are extended to include "computer abuse as^ pre
viously defined,^® "business computer abuses" would include inva
sions of privacy, misleading sales practices in the computer
industry, and deceptive presentations of computerized data analy
ses. Both individuals and organizations may be the "victims" of
these practices.®®
III. Individuals as Victims of Business Computer Abuse
As computerized information systems spread throughout the
economy, and are used as a medium to record transactions between
organizations and their individual clients, the opportunities for com-
25. In this respect, the Uterature ofcomputer crime parallels much ofthe crime
literature, which neglects organizational and occupational crimes. See, e.g.. Crime at
THE Top: Deviance in Business and the Professions (J. Johnson &J. Douglas eds.
1978).
26. See note 4 supra.
27. See Sover, Defining Organizational Crime, in Corporate and Governmental
Deviance: Problems of Organizational Behavior in Contemporary Society 37
(M. Ermann &R. Lundman eds. 1978).
28. See Quinney, The Study of White Collar Crime: Toward a Reonentatton in
Theory and Practice, in White Collar Crime: Offenses inBusiness, Politics, and
THE Professions 283 (G. Geis &R. Meier eds. rev. 1977).
29. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
30. This is not to minimize the importance ofpersonal crimes or abuses of trust.
Simple abuses of trust, like embezzlement, receive the lion's share of attention.
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puter-related abuses and crimes are likely to increase. These acts
may occur in any ofseveral ways. Customers oforganizations using
electronic billing, funds transfer, or calculating aids {e.g., supermar
ket scanners) may simply be defrauded. As the data collected in
these systems increases in richness, it is likely to be used for other
purposes, such as identifying "good customers" or locating debtors,
which intrude on the privacy of the individual custpmer.
If individuals who elect to use computerized financial services
are mislead as to the attendant risks and habilities by service prov
iders, they will suffer unexpected and unfair losses. These losses in
clude a, broad range of activities—consumer fraud, invasion of
personal privacy, and false advertising—and range from practices
that some parties feel are abusive, but are well within the bound of
legal business practices, to those that clearly violate current laws.
Civil libertarians argue that routine organizational practices un
duly invade personal privacy. For example, computer-using organi
zations have begun using their data files for new purposes, such as
market surveys, matching payroll records against welfare files to
identify "cheaters," and using business records for the Parent Loca
tor Service.®^ Supporters of these practices emphasize their effi
ciency in helping an organization conduct its business or a pubhc
agency carry out its legislated obUgations. Civil libertarians advo
cate maviTniiTTi individual liberty as a competing value, which should
not be easily compromised.^^ •Jeremiah Guttman, for example, as
serts:
As valuable to the business and scientific communities as such re
search might prove, the use of data acquired and maintained by an
electronic funds transfer system for any purpose other than trans
fer of money would be to tntsuse the system, to abuse it, to betray a
reasonable anticipation of privacy to which the consumer is enti-
tled.^^
31. See Privacy Protection Study Comm'n, Personal Privacy in an Informa
tion Society (1977).
32. See Kling,. Value Conflicts and Social Choice in Electronic Funds Transfer
System Developments, 21 Com. ACM 642 (1978).
33. J. Gutman, Observations of a Civil Libertarian on ElectronicFunds Transfer 2
(May 1979) (unpublished manuscript); emphasis added. Some uses of financial rec
ordsystems for other purposes, such as the Parent Locator System, aremandated by
law. Personal communications with Robert P. Bigelow, May 19,1980. To civil libertar
ians, the abusiveness of a practice and its legality are independent. One may hope
that laws will not permit or even mandate "abusive" practices, but legality is no in
surance that a practice is not harmful. First, there must be a language of discourse
about the character and consequences of proposed statutes in which attributes such
as the "interests they serve," their constitutionality, their efficacy, their enforceabil-
ity, and their abusiveness can beanalyzed and discussed. Second, laws areoften the
product of legislative compromises between conflicting interests which may even
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An analyst of computer abuse with civil liberttirian sympathies
would concentrate on a different set of episodes than one who ac
cepts prevailing "legitimate," organizational record-handling prac
tices as unabusive by definition.
Advertising and complex contracts that mislead or confuse con
sumers about the nature of computerized financial services is a sec
ond example of business computer abuse. Evidence about these
practices is scant and usually anecdotal. For example, Mark
Budnitz carefully examined the case of one pay-by-phone service,
whose advertising misled customers about its convenience and lia-
bilities.34 Usually, legal remedies are employed to ameliorate
problems like these. While laws such as the federal EFT Act^s and
the New York consumer contract law 3® require that contracts "be
written in a clear and coherent manner using words with common
and everyday meanings,"®'' business practices may not comply.
There is little evidence about the extent to which actual contracts
for EFT services meet these criteria. One recent survey of EFT con
tracts and advertising by fifteen New York state-chartered banks
suggests that there are serious discrepancies between the intent of
these laws and routine practices.®®
Some banks took greater care to insure that their contracts were
able to be easily read and understood .... However, even when
customer contracts of the more conscientious banks are compared
to promotional contracts used by all the banks to entice new EFT
customers, the shortcomings of the contracts are clear and the po
tential for readable contracts becomes obvious. The banks artfully
designed the promotional materials .... When compared with the
contracts, the promotional materials were printed in more simpli
fied language and with more effective use of large and bold print
.... Furthermore, none of the promotional materials we reviewed
described all the terms and conditions written into the customer
contracts. The most important omission from the promotional
materials was the provision on the customer's liability for unautho
rized use of his debit card.®®
These practices certainly leave substantial room for abuse.
hold nnnflicHng values. In the case of data collected for one puipose being made
available for other purposes, one must weigh the value of personal privacy against
the values of efficient state investigations and the profitability of private enterprise.
See xiing, note 1 supra, Privacy Protkction Study Comm'n, note 40supra.
34. See Budnitz, note 11 supra.
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq. (1978).
36. See Abrahamson &Martin, the Impact of the Federal EFT Act on Consumer
Contracts in New York State^ 13 U.S.F.L1. Rev. 467 (1979).
37. Id. at 469. See N.Y. Gen. Obug. Law § 5-702 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
38. See Abrahamson & Martin, note 36 supra.
39. Id. at 469-71.
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Stronger regulations for fair and complete advertising as well as
simple contracts may ease these difficulties. As Budnitz notes:
[ijt is unrealistic to expect financial institutions voluntarily to de
scribe what may go wrong if they use EFT, or to provide more com
plete disclosure than the law requires. However, it is equally
unrealistic to pretend that consumers who lack this information
trulyunderstand the consequences of agreeing to use EFT.^
Unfortunately, the ease of disclosure is made difficult by complex or
ambiguous laws sich as the EFT Act, wbere the very conditions of
liability are incomplete. For example, Broadman observes that the
EFT Act may be read as limiting a consumer's liability to $0, $50 or
$500, when he informs a bank of a lost debit card within two days,
depending on how one reads the text.^^
The third class of abusive activities, computer-related consumer
frauds, are also poorly treated in the literature on computer crime.^
Reports of "consumer difficulties" with computerized billing and
payment systems are easy to find, though episodic. While the tran
sitions from "consumer difficulties" to "consumer abuse" to "con
sumer fraud" are neither direct nor simple, evidence of systematic
consumer difficulties is the most hkely indicator of fraud. Many
people have had difficulties with errors in computerized systems
and in correcting errors once they are found. There is no reason to
suspect that such errors are necessarily intentional, rather than ac
cidental.
Even the better automated record systems are not entirely free
of data and software errors. Since imperfection is the rule, the prac-
/ tical questions hinge on the quality of the data and software, and
the extent to which an organizaton is attentive to correcting data
and software errors. While the boundaries between "accident,"
"negligence," and "criminal negligence" may be clear in principle,
they are difficult to specify in practice in automated data systems.
All computer systems of any scale are likely to suffer from sys
tem design flaws and data entry errors. The presence of errors de
tected, in say, disputed billings, only suggests the possibility of
abuse or crime rather than "commonly accepted" and "acceptable"
difficulties. Much depends upon the rate of errors found in specific
systems, the extent to which design flaws are corrected over time,
and the ease that consumers have in bringing errors to the attention
of organizational staff and having them resolved. Despite the wide
spread and increasing use of computerized systems in business
40. Budnitz, supra note 11, at 369.
41. See Broadman, supra note 11, at 256.
42. For example, they are ignored in the recent prosecution manual. RESOtJHCE
Manual, note 9 supra.
r
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transactions, little systematic data is publicly available on these
matters.
There are indications, however, that consumers have had diffi
culties in correcting computerized errors. Consumer-oriented cen
ters set up to investigate consumer complaints attributable to
computer errors shed some light on the presence of consumer diffi
culties. Theodor Sterling has reported on a variety of cases of com
puter "billing errors" that were referred to a "Computer
Ombudsman Office" administered by a society of computer special-
ists.^3 One trade newspaper, Computerworld, routinely reports com
puter errors which are brought to the attention of a special
contributor, Alan Taylor, by individual complainants. While only a
few episodes are published each year, these are relatively "hard
cases," since they are brought by complainants who typically have
persisted in seeking to correct an error without success.^
Victimization surveys could shed light On the occurrence of un
toward errors and abuses, if not consumer crimes, which are associ
ated with computer systems. Sterling recently conducted a mail
survey of five hundred households in British Columbia about their
experiences errors in such systems.^s Approximately forty percent
of those sampled reported at least one error in the preceding year,
and about fifteen percent reported two or more errors. One hundred
and five households reported specific problems and errors with com
puterized transactions.
Each of these reports was followed up with an extensive tele
phone interview. Of those people with errors, seventy-four percent
were able to resolve them, though satisfactorily solution required
several contacts with the computer-using organization. Some re
spondents found error-correcting to be a time-consuming activity.^
Moreover, some respondents suffered additional costs, since they
were unable to have the interest charges on disputed amounts re-
43 The office was sponsoredby the Vancouver Chapter of the CanadianInforma
tion I^ocessing Society. See Sterling, The Computer Ombudsman: Rational for Set
ting Up a Permanent Service^ Can. Datasys., Aug., 1976, at 62; Sterling, supra note 11,
at 31; Sterling &Laudon, Humanizing Information Systems, 22 Datamation, Dec. 1976,
at 53. .
44. See, e.g., Taylor, New Approach Combats Deceptive Trade Practices, Com
puterworld] Aug. 6, 1979, at 21, col. 1; Taylor, Two Problems Crop Up in Bankcard Pro
cedures, Computerworld, Aug. 20, 1979, at 15, col. 1. The second article illustrates a
particular consumer complaint investigated by Alan Taylor. Taylor is known among
computer specialists for these investigations, and receives complaints that would not
be the basis of news stories in the daily, less specialized, press.
,45. See Sterling, note 10 supra.
46. Twenty percent of those interviewed spent more than twenty hours attempt
ing to resolve a single error.
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moved, even v^rhen they were reimbursed or credited for the dis
puted ambunts.4' Seven percent of the respondents gave up trying
to resolve their difficulties. Ofthe remaining households, eight per
cent never tried to resolve the computer errors and eleven percent
were engaged in an ongoing, but uncompleted, effort to resolve their
problems at the time of the interview.
Sterling's study indicates that correcting computerized errors is
much more troublesome than conventional accounts of computer
use suggest. Furthermore, it was quite clear to many of the respon
dents that their identification oferrors and attempt to correct them
were not appreciated by the staff with which they dealt. "In 16 per
cent of cases respondents reported that they were coerced m some
way to pay a disputed amount, and in approximately 9percent of
the cases they were specifically urged to pay a disputed amount in
order to protect their 'good credit rating.' Sterling's study under
lines the way in which computerized transaction systems can inter
sect the contractual side of transactions between the public and
computer-using organizations.
Sterling's study, and "The Taylor Report" can only be sugges
tive of the extent of the problems facing consumers. Alan Taylor
selects cases from an unspecified universe ofconsumer complaints.
Sterling's study is but one investigation, based on a special sample,
and does not track the complaints backto the computerrusing orga
nizations to examine theirorganizational etiology. Certainly the fre
quency of events reported by SterUng are likely to vary from sample
to sample, place to place, and time to time. But the critical ques
tions are whether this data is credible and whether it indicates
likely consumer abuses where the clients of organizations are vic
timized.^®
While consumer studies of this nature do riot directly address
the question of whether individuals are being subjected to inten
tional, abusive bilhng practices using computerized systems, they do
indicate, at the very least, that many people are experiencing errors
47. Thirty-six percent of the households with errors had interest charged on the
disputed amount. In nineteen percent of the cases, the interest was removed at the
time the error inthe charges was corrected. Another eleven percent required yet ad
ditional action to have the interest on the disputed amount removed. Six percent of
the households paid interest in the disputed amount.
48. Sterling, supra note 10, at 286-87. j i, tj
49. One ofSterUng's rates, that ofbiUing error, is simUar to that reported byRon
ald Anderson in a study of pubUc perceptions of computing. Anderson, Soctol^cal
Analysis of Public Attitudes Toward Computers and Information Files, in Proc.
AFIPS Second Joint Computer Cone. 649 (1972). In a random sample of Min-
nesotans surveyed in 1971, thirty-five percent reported having problems with a com
puterizedbill in the preceding year.
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with such systems, and that some of these errors prove so difficult to
correct that people pay the amount rather than continuing to fight
their cases. In none of the cases published in "The Taylor Report"
or reported by Sterling could criminal intent be proved. It was sim
ply not investigated, sincethe goal of the complaint bureaus is to in
vestigate, negotiate and rectify individual complaints. In these
negotiations, the ombusdman adopts a strategy which allows the or
ganization's staff the greatest opportunity to correct the error with
out losing face. Consequently, the ombudsman is more hkley to
avoid blaming errors on intentional acts, or trying to pin down
blame and motive, as would an investigator seeking evidence of
criminal activity. Nor could a telephone survey of Consumers pro
vide data about the intent of the organization. One possible excep
tion is the extent to which consumers were coerced into paying
disputed bills.
Moreover, since the sample in a citizen survey is selected to rep
resent a geographically defined population, rather than the chentele
of a particular firm, it is impossible to draw conclusions about the
consumer practices of any given firm. Suppose that consumers in a
probability sample drawn from a large metropolitan area com
plained of problems with Bigmart five times as often as with
Fastmart in a study of consumer difficulties with computerized in
formation systems. Bigmart's bilhng and error correction procedures
could be seen as poorly developed, abusive, and possibly even
fraudulent. However, if one knew that Bigmart has twenty times
the number of customers as Fastmart, one should conclude that its
procedures are actually "cleaner." Nonetheless, it is hard to review
Sterling's report and the occasional cases published in Com-
puterworld and escape the suspicion that some businesses are sys
tematically abusing their customers with automated transaction
systems and their procedures for identifying and correcting errors.^®
As consumer-oriented computer systems, such as electronic
funds transfer systems and supermarket scanners, become more
commonplace, it is hkely that the incidence of losses related to com
puter errors,will rise. Whether these losses are accidental, the re
sult of negligence, or intentional, can only be determined
empirically. But special attention needs to be given to consumer
50. There is some evidence that consumer abuses are infrequently reported to
consumer protection agencies. While other forms of consumer abuse, such as home
repair swindlesand "bait-and-switch" sales practices may form the majorityof larger
consumer abuses, there is a paucity of evidence from which to draw strong conclu
sions about the incidence and importance of consumer-related abuses. See McGuire
&Edelhertz, Consumer Abuse of Older Americans: Victimization and Remedial Action
in Two Metropolitan Areas, in G. Geis &E. Stotland, supra note 6, at 266.
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difficulties if they are investigated at all, since they are unlikely to
be reported in the press or brought to the attention of lawyers or
prosecutors without special support. Individual losses are Ukely to
be small, even if they are large when aggregated over thousands of
customers and transactions. It is most likely that individuals will
simply seek to recover their own losses, and it is difficult to prove
"intent" in most cases.
The three different kinds of computer-related activities dis
cussed in this section (1) turning financial record-keeping systems
into instruments of surveillance or research, (2) completeness and
clarity of advertising and contracts of computerized services, (3)
and procedures for correcting errors in computerized billing sys
tems, illustrate the ways in which "computer abuse" is a socially-de
fined label, since the legitimacy of each of these activities is subject
to debate. There is little evidence about the incidence or seriousness
of each of these kinds of activities, but they usually are ignored by
analysts of "computer abuse," even though they may constitute a
large fraction of abuses.
IV. Organizations as Victims of Business Computer Abuse
Increasingly, computerized systems appear as instruments in
the transactions between organizations: sales and payments are re
corded, computer equipment and software is bought and sold, and
organizational participants display theirwork to clients andauditors
in other organizations using computer-based data analysis for in
sight andpersuasion. Certainly, organizations can be the victims of
con games that employ computerized systems as instruments. For
example, if a firm is sending bogus bills to randomly selected busi
nesses for services that were never rendered, the businesses may
pay the bills as if they were routine expenses properly incurred. If
the bogus bills are produced by a computer system—to increase
theirlegitimacy andpermit operations ona larger scale—^this would
be a computer fraud. Similarly, businesses are the identified victims
in a variety of other computer crimes, such as fraud®^ and embez
zlement.
Of interest in this section, howeverj are "routine" business prac
tices which may be examples of computer abuse or computer crime,
but which are ignored in the literature. There are three common
place occupational activities involving computer technology, which
can range from those that are clearly legitimate, to some that are
51. See, e.g., Vaughan, Crime Between Organizations: Implications for Vic-
timology, id. at 77.
420 COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL [Vol. II
questionable, to still others that are deemed abusive, unethical, and
possibly criminal. These activities involve:
1. Selling computing equipment and services;
2. "Delivering" software which meets contractual specifications;
3. Employing complex or sophisticated computer technologies to,
persuade a client that a given course of conduct is appropriate.
All of these activities include legitimate practices. Salesmen are
expected to place their wares in the best possible light. Software
developers will produce products that resemble the contract specifi
cations. Analysts, such as engineers, actuaries, and urban planners,
are expected to utilize sophisticated mea,ns, including computer-
based systems, to provide better insight or "analytic penetration"
into complex problems.
However, the staff acting for the computer-using or computer-
selhng organization can also rely on strategems to adyance the in
terests of their own organization, subunit or job, which "cause
losses" to the client organization. Sales staff will certainly inform
prospective buyers of software developed for their machine which
meets the client's needs. Sometimes, however, the promised
software is very remote from what the client actually requires.^^
Early delivery deadlines may be set to "beat the competition," even
though they are unrealistic and turn out later to be unattainable.
Similarly, vendors sometimes sell undersized equipment, since the
lower price may better the competition; once the equipment is ac
quired, the customer is locked into upgrading from the same ven
dor.®^ Some misrepresentations are unintentional, but others which
clearly serve the vendor's interest are likely to be negligent or inten
tional. Sales staff vary in the integrity with which they make
promises, and in their sophistication in accurately assessing their
own product lines and likely delivery schedule. Consequently, it is
52. See Crabtree &Kling, DP Sales Ploysand Counterploys, 24Datamation, May
1978, at 194.
53. Undersizing computer systems may also serve the interest of the user. For
example, there is one large, multi-division organization which has a policy about the
level ofscrutiny given to computer system acquisitions ofdifferent sizes. That organi
zation has annual operating revenues ofapproximately one billion dollars andseveral
thousand employees spread over several geographically dispersed divisions. Systems
or components which cost less than $100,000 may be authorized by division Sectors
without any evaluation of integrating the acquisition into the organization-wide com
puting plan. The staff ofanoperating department inone division wished toacquire a
computer system which cost almost $175,000. With the support of the division direc
tor, they proposed a $95,000 system, which was too small for the intended task. The
system, however, could then be approved at the division level, and expanded to its
proper size in the following fiscal year.
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difficult to clearly demonstrate that unreliable sales promises were
intentionally misleading, except in the most blatant cases.
Some sales practices are related to discrepancies between the
usually vague contractual specifications for software, and the rela
tively concrete package that is ,actually provided to the customer.
"Missing features" are common in contractually developed software.
Estimating the costs of complex software is more art than science,
and a poorly developed art for many. Since there are not particu
larly strong professional standards by which to compare software
costing or scheduling strategies.^^ Consequently, it may be difficult
to distinguish a good professional judgment which results in a poor
outcome, from a poor professional judgment, and further, to distin
guish either of these from rank deception, except in the most brazen
cases.
One illustrative example concerns the case of a software firm,
Softmix,55 which developed a special system for a pubUc agency,
Govworks, on a fixed fee contract. The package did not meet all of
the contractual specifications, but the computing specialists were
encouraged to develop a "minimal" running system that could be
turned over to Govworks at the earliest possible date. After
Govworks' contractingofficer accepted the minimal system, Softmix
could be awarded a new "maintenance" contract, which would bring
in the additional revenue heeded to pay for the remaining develop
ment.
Even sharply defined contracts, however, may not be sufficient.
One example concerns a major computer manufacturer, Byterite,
that provides a FORTRAN language on its SUMMA machine series,
which is suppose to meet ANSP® FORTRAN standards. A program
mer was assigned to maintain Byterite's SUMMA FORTRAN by im
plementing enhancements, repairing errors, and issuing memos
about new developments. Some of the error reports that she re
ceivedfrom installations using SUMMA FORTRAN indicated subtle
but important discrepancies between SUMMA FORTRAN and ANSI
FORTRAN. FORTRAN programiriers who believed that SUMMA
54. SeeWolverton &Boehm, Software CostModelling: Some Lessons Learned, in
Prog, of Second Software Lifecycle Management Workshop 129 (IEEE Com-
puter Soc'y 1978). , • j-
55. "Softmix" is a pseudonym for a particular softwarefirm.'The followmg discus-
sion will identify other organizations by similar pseudonyms, e.g., Govworks, Byter
ite.
56. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) develops standards for
various programming languages. TOese are voluntary standards in principle, but
often compulsory in practice, since federal agencies usually specify, that software
must meet ANSI standards.
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FORTRAN was compatible with the ANSI standard wrote programs
which did not run "properly." SUMMA's programmer prepared a va
riance report which she planned to send to all sites using SUMMA
FORTRAN. Her supervisor objected, arguing that Bjdierite could not
acknowledge any discrepancy between the two versions of FOR
TRAN since it was contractually obligated to provide an ANSI-com
patible language. She persisted, since she knew of the difficulties
that the unexpected discrepancy was causing in the field. In face of
threatened termination, she relented and did not publish the re
port.®'' The programmer was demoralized and later left her job.
Data about matters such as this is, of course, scant and anecdotal. It
appears that programmers resolve difficulties such as there pri
vately—^by compliance or departure. Those who complain loudly, or
"blow the whistle," are likely to be penalized in their "efficiency re
views" or fired.
The use of computers to favorably impress clients or auditors is
commonplace. One of the most frequently cited computer crimes,
the case of Equity Funding,®® illustrates a case of deception on a
grand scale. Remarkably, the literature ofcomputer crime and com
puterabuse chronicle few other cases where computerized informa
tion systems were used as instruments of impression management.
Such cases, however, are reported by social analysts who examine
computer use in organizations. Rob KJing reports the case ofa wel
fare agency which used an automated client tracking system to fa
vorably impress federal auditors,®® and the case of an engineering
firm which turned to complex data analyses to "snow" auditors
hired by its clientto review a slow moving project.®®
The success of the Polaris missle project was often attributed to
the use of PERT scheduling, which was specifically developed for it.
However, Harvey Sapolsky persuasively argues that PERT was not
used to manage Polaris schedule and costs.®' The admiral in charge
of Polaris development was not concerned how PERT was used,
only that its presence be visible. PERT served to sufficiently en
hance the image of the Navy teams managing Polaris development
57. See, e.g., the case ofVirginia Edgerton, as reported in 22 Tech. &Soc'y (IEEE
Soc'y Comm. onthe Social Implications ofTech. [no date]). For a case ofengineer
ing design with similar dynamics, see Vandivier, Why Should My Conscience Bother
Me?, in Life in Organizations: Workplaces as People Experience Them (R.
Kanter & B. Stein eds. 1979).
58. See the Equity Funding case, reported in D. Parker, supra note 4, ch. 13; T.
WmTESiDE, supra note 1, ch. 2.
59. See Kling, note 4 supra.
60. See Kling, SocialAnalyses of Computing: Theoretical Perspectives in Recent
Empirical Research, 12Computing Surveys 67 (Mar. 1980).
61. See H. Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development (1972).
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that they were relatively unburdened by the scrutiny and intrusive
demands of external review boards. On other projects, PERT might
well serve as an instrument of managerial control. But in its first,
and most publicized use, it served primarily as an instrument of de
ceit.
These three kinds of activities—selling computerized equip
ment, delivering software to contractual specifications, and using
computerized systems for impression management—can each entail
abusive practices in the course of routine work for participants in
organizations.
V. The Etiology of Computer Abuse
When analysts of computer abuse or computer crime consider
the "causes" of these activities, they emphasize individual proclivi
ties. Parker, for example, has identified profiles of "computer abuse
perpetrators" based on interviews with people who engaged in per
sonal crimes or abuses of trust. Mowshowitz criticizes this approach
for neglecting the ethos of the organization which employs the
"computer abuse perpetrator."®^ He beheves that Parker's data sup
ports the hypothesis that "computer abuse perpetrators" are acting
in accord with the ethos of their employer, but have turned their be
havior against the employer rather than performing on his behalf.
Thus, a workplace principle that "customers can be deceived if they
won't bear visible losses" can be modified to legitimatize embezzling
sums that are not "visible" to the organization.®^ Mowshowitz's
analysis shifts attention from characteristics of the individual—his
background, motives, financial needs and opportunities—^to the so
cial context in which computer abuses take place.®^
In the business computer abuses examined in this article, abu
sive sales practices, contractual frauds, or deceptive impression
management techniques constitute the corrupt ethos which Mow
showitz employs as an explanation.®® In the case of many business
computer abuses or computer crimes, practices which entail com-
62. See Mowshowitz, Computers and Ethical Judgment in Organizations, in
Proc. 1978 Nat'l ACM COnf. 675 (1978).
63. A Security PacificBank oflScial reported that Rtfkin's theft of $10.2 millionwas
sufficiently small, given the bank's volume of transactions, that the sum was unlikely
to have been missed or felt as a profound loss. While Rifkin was not an employee,
and the theft was technically wire fraud, rather than computer theft, it is sufficiently
close to illustrate the principle.
64. See Altheide, Adler, Adler &Altheide, The Social Meaning ofEmployee Theft,
in J. Johnson &J. Douglas, supra note 25, at 90.
65. While these localized ethical orientations might be further explained by refer
ence to the broader "ethos of capitalism," such explanations are ad-hoc.
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puting may be similar to other work practices which are less related
to computing. Of these activities, impression management strate
gies common in entrepreneurial andbureaucratic organizations may
be widespread, with or without computing.®®
However, different abusive practices may be the by-product of
different social processes. One promising line of inquiry examines
the social arrangements under which systematic abuses are most
likely. Recent analyses of industries in which illegal practices are
common have led sociologists to develop the conception of crimi-
nogenic markets" and "conditioned" or "coerced" crime. Leonard
and Weber, for example, have examined abusive and illegal prac
tices adopted by automobile dealers, including "forcing accessories,"
"service gouging," "high finance [charges]," "parts pushing," and
the "warranty sham."®"' While these activities are carried outby the
sales and service personnel of new car dealerships, Leonard and
Weber argue that they are "conditioned by" policies of the major
automakers. The "criminogenic" policies which regulate the rela
tions between the automakers and their dealers reward them for
new car sales and implicitly penalize good service. They also pro
vide dealers with meager markups for selUng "stripped down" ver
sions of new cars.
Farberman explicitly defines a "criminogenic market" as "the
deliberate and lawful enactment of policies by those who manage
economically concentrated and vertically integrated corporations
and/or industries which coerce lower level (dependent) participants
into unlawful acts."®® He also notes that "[tjhose who set the condi
tions which cause others to commit unlawful acts remain non-culpa
ble."®®
If the sales staff of a contract software firm sets contract dates
without consulting with the technical staff, or "lowball" the esti
mates to "beat the competition," the technical staff are unlikely to
be able to dehver on the contract.™ These arrangements would be
criminogenic, and the technical staff is placed in the position of cov-
66. See R. Gabriel & P. Savage, Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the
Army (1978); P. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (1955).
67. See Leonard &Weber, Automakers and Dealers: A Study in Criminogenic
Market Forces, in G. Geis &R. Meier, supra note 28, at 133.
68. See Farberman, A Criminogenic Market Structure: The Automobile Industry,
16 Soc. Qtrly 438, 438 (1975), repnnted in Social Interaction 146, 160 (H. Robbey, S.
Greenblatt & C. Clark eds. 1979).
69. Id.
70. Sometimes, the technical staffand marketing staffanticipate each other's ac
tions. The technical staff will increase its deadlines or budgets by, say one hundred
percent, and the marketing staff will, inturn, reduce their estimates by one-half.
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ering up the areas where the product fails to meet specifications.
Unfortunately, there is little systematic data about arrangements
such as these, even though they are known to participants in the
software industry and a source of dissatisfaction among software
specialists.
It is difficult to understand the etiology of business crimes and
abuses by reference to a profile of "abuse perpetrators," since busi
ness abuses are often "normal" occupational activities. To the ex
tent that this is the case, perpetrators will bei identical to other
participants in the sante organization or occupation. An alternative
perspective shifts attention from the proclivities of individuals to
the structuring of organizational worlds which make abusive or un
toward activities more likely. Contractual frauds in the dehvery of
computer software may be a by-product of "criminogenic" organiza
tional arrangements. This is a tentative explanation, and does not
necessarily fit all forms of business computer abuse. It does, how
ever, provide a promising starting point for serious investigation."'^
VI. Conclusion
Computer uses are increasing in variety, and a larger fraction of
socially and economically sensitive data are maintained on auto
mated data systems. Questions concerning the vulnerability of
these systems to abuse or their use as abusive instruments are be
coming increasingly important. The audiences for investigations in
clude computer specialists, technology assessors, auditors, law
enforcement agents, prosecutors, lawyers, legislators and consumer
advocates. These groups, however, have somewhat different orienta
tions and interests in different forms of computer abuse or computer
crime.
Much of the hterature on computer abuse and crime is sensi
tizing, and is written to attract attention to the peculiar problems of
computerization. Unfortunately, it also sensationalizes computer
crimes and abuses to help attract attention. The labels "computer
crime" and "computer abuse" have been overgeneralized. In this ar
ticle, a broad range of activities which can be identified as computer
abuses or computer crimes have been examined. But, in practice,
these terms have denoted personal crimes and abuses of trust.
Spectacular wire frauds and embezzlements make interesting
reading and capture popular imagination, but probably illustrate
only a small class of important computer abuses and computer
crimes. Occupational crimes are usually ignored, except insofar as
71. For one investigation, which uses the characteristics of organizational victims
and interorganizational relations as a point of departure, see Vaughan, note 51 supra.
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they are abuses of trust. As a consequence, the computer crime and
abuse literature emphasizes the protection of computer-using orga
nizations, rather than the public.
Fortunately, there are relatively few instances of verified com
puter abuses or crimes. Thus, most analyses draw strong conclu
sions from small collections of cases. These studies include claims
about the natm-e and etiology of computer abuses, the nature of per
petrators and victims, the conditions under which these acts occur,
and their social significance. That is to be expected at this time. But
it is important to expand the common conceptions of computer
abuse and crimes to include business and occupational activities.
It may not be prudent for all forms of abuse to be prohibited or
remedied by legal actions. If, however, one is interested in reducing
the frequency of "computer abuses," a serious approach cannot
merely emphasize the "deviant acts" of ne'er-do-wells who engage
in personal crimes or abuses of trust. To the extent that computer-
related abuses and crimes are business or occupational activities,
strategies for abatement will have to be altered. That means that
programs to minimize computer abuse would emphasize matters
other than the detection and prosecution of clever computer manip
ulators. They would attempt to inhibit contractual abuses of com
puter systems by providing some protection for "whistle blowers."
Such programs aimed at minimizing computer-related consumer
abuse would include a variety of measures, from laws such as the
EFT Act to provide consumers with minimal protections in case of
errors, through the establishment of consumer action agencies.
Lawyers and lawmakers are particularly concerned about activi
ties such as "computer abuse" or "computer crime" insofar as they
alter the lawful relationships between parties or merit changes of
law. However, clear conceptions of the kinds of abuses or crime in
which computerized technologies may be significant are useful for
other purposes as well. In particular, they help policymakers, man
agers, consumers, legislators in their role as reviewers of adminis
trative activity, and computer specialists to understand the
opportunities and difficulties of different modes of computer devel
opment and use and the appropriateness of different strategies for
resolving difficulties.
This article has sought to expand the prevailing conceptions of
the nature of computer abuse and the conditions under which
abuses are likely. It identifies the kinds of abusive activities in
which organizations may be "perpetrators," as well as "victims." It
also suggests some ways in which abusive practices in the develop
ment sale and provision of computer-based systems and services
should not be viewed simply as "regrettable" events which su-e the
FEB 16 1987
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acts of a few misguided individuals. Rather, they should be viewed
as routine organizational practices which are likely to-occur under
specifiable conditions. The vast majority of activities practiced in
the development, sale or use of computing are neither abusive not
criminal. However, the prevailing conceptions of computer abuse
are simply too narrow and self-assured. Taken together, these
points indicate that the current spate of computer crime bills are
based on these narrow conceptions of computer abuse and com
puter crime, and fail to come to terms with the conditions under
which computing may be most abusive for organizations or the gen
eral public.
